Open-source AI agent harnesses · used in real attacks

Harnessesin theWild

Dataset v1 · updated 2026-09-19
Window May → Sep 2026
Every row links a primary source
7Open-source harnesses used in real attacks
5Confirmed in a real operation
9Named attacker groups or operators
6Reporting sources: Talos, Anthropic, GTIG, Unit 42, Gambit, Zenity
3Tied to a confirmed breach: PentestGPT, PentAGI, OpenClaw
Attacker What it did
01 PentestGPTautonomous pentest agent CONFIRMED UAT-10147Chinese-speaking, financially motivated Installed on the attacker’s command server. Scanned web servers, ran PoC exploits, broke into at least one site. 170,000URLs targeted Yes
2026-08-20
02 PentAGImulti-agent pentest system CONFIRMED GTG-50020Russian-speaking criminalsGTG-50029French-speaking hacktivist Named by Anthropic as a framework both groups used. One stole production AI API keys; the other dumped European political databases. 12–26 GBdatabases taken Yes
2026-09-10
03 OpenClawgeneral-purpose agent CONFIRMED “Recon” operatorfinancially motivatedUnnamed operatorSpanish-speaking Ran a mass credential-harvesting operation. A second operator exploited Telegram Mini Apps and dumped their databases. 23,800+secrets stolen Yes
2026-09-08
04 Hermes Agenton DeepSeek, run over Telegram CONFIRMED knaithe / KnYuanChinese-speaking Recon and exploit attempts against Langflow and n8n. The agent’s exploits failed; a Citrix exploit run by hand got in. 0agent exploits landed Human only
2026-07-30
05 oh-my-claudecodeadd-on layer for Claude Code CONFIRMED Zerofot Chained with Codex and Claude Code to build a credential harvester that repaired itself when it broke. 3agents chained Tooling
2026-08-31
06 HexStrike AIwith Graphiti memory graph OBSERVED Suspected China-linked actor Moved between recon tools on its own against a Japanese tech firm and an East Asian security company. 2named targets Not stated
2026-05-11
07 Strixmulti-agent pentest framework OBSERVED Suspected China-linked actorplus an attacker on hijacked AI servers Validated vulnerabilities in the same campaign. A honeypot caught it aimed at a live French shop with no permission prompts. 2,000+unattended steps Not stated
2026-05 · 06
No documented attack yet, despite the coverage: VillagerCAIShannonDecepticonZen-AI-PentestKali MCPMetasploit MCP

PatternThe agents mostly do recon and vulnerability checks. When an exploit fails, a human finishes the job.

Evidence tiersConfirmed means a vendor, IR firm or CERT shows the harness in a real operation. Observed means it was aimed at real targets, but no breach is stated.

ScopePublished cases, not rates. Commercial agents like Claude Code, Codex and Gemini CLI are left out on purpose.